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ABSTRACT
In this paper we propose Time Synchronized One-Time-Password scheme to provide secure wake up
authentication. The main constraint of wireless sensor networks is their limited power resource that
prevents us from using radio transmission over the network to transfer the passwords. On the other hand
computation power consumption is insignificant when compared to the costs associated with the power
needed for transmitting the right set of keys. In addition to prevent adversaries from reading and following
the timeline of the network, we propose to encrypt the tokens using symmetric encryption to prevent replay
attacks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On duty cycling protocols, nodes periodically activated to perform communications and sleep
after all the tasks are completed to enable them to save power until the next scheduled wake up
[1, 2]. The problem related to this protocol is that nodes will have to wake up even if
communications are not necessary so they can monitor the channel for data; as a result the nodes
waste precious energy resources to activate the receiver and the MCU (microcontroller unit) in
order to listen to the channel. In addition depending on the application’s requirements, duty cycle
protocols are unable to transmit the data on demand to the channel because the transmissions are
scheduled[3].
On the other hand asynchronous protocols do not face the same duty cycle problem[4] because
the sleeping operation is not a scheduled procedure nodes can sleep most of the time until they are
required to wake up and instantly transmit data when it is necessary. Since sleep is not scheduled
in these protocols, it means that the sleep can be interrupted in several ways which causes nodes
to become vulnerable to malicious attacks such as denial of sleep[5]. Denial of sleep attack can
either interrupt the sleep or prevent the node from going to sleep after transmission which results
in an unnecessary drain on the power resources of the node.
Another problem that asynchronous protocols face is the authentication of requests. The physical
characteristics of radio communications demand power in order to receive and calculate the
integrity of a message. In cases where the captured data failed to authenticate the node will have
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to use power to reject it. In this paper we propose the use of tokens to initiate a connection before
the establishment of communication in order to avoid any unnecessary power consumption on
rejected messages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will analyse previous work undertaken by
other researchers. Section 3 will evaluate the use of wakeup receivers and one time passwords to
counter the ‘Denial of Sleep’ attack.
2. RELATED WORK
The proposed scheme benefit’s from two previous areas of research. Firstly “wake up receivers”
that investigates the use of an additional, very low power receiver, to be used only for the
purpose of receiving an asynchronously signal and wake up the rest parts of the node as and when
required. Secondly “One-Time-Password authentication” that is used to generate passwords with
a short validity period i.e.: one login or one transaction. Their purpose is to avoid replay attacks
by potential intruders capturing the password.
2.1 Wake-up receivers
Wake-up receivers are mainly designed to be used on asynchronous communication models to
receive only “request to send” signals[6]. Their physical characteristics allow them to monitor a
radio channel and receive signals using negligible amounts of energy on low data rates. One of
the first designs of wake-up receivers for wireless sensor networks designed to extract the power
of the signal in order to provide energy to operate the receiver circuit[7]. Plethora of researches
on Wake-up receivers, have also been conducted on passive RFID that provides them with viable
solution as proposed on [2]. Wake-up scheme is vital for passive RFID devices because they
rarely use their communications. One of the most recent papers [8]combines wake-up scheme
with security and possible attacks along with solutions to secure using specific tokens as signals
to wake up the procedure.
2.2 One-Time Password
Since 1981 when Lamport introduced one time password schemes, many banks authentication
systems are now using his theory to prevent reuse of a static password [9]. The main idea of one-
time password schemes is that the password changes on each authentication and derives either
from a static mathematical expression or by the actual time of day and changes periodically which
is called counter one-time-password or time synchronized one-time-password.
The merit of time synchronized protocols is that it does not require complex calculations or a
certification authority but only a counter to maintain the synchronization. On the other hand to
achieve tolerance, the actual time has to be separated into time slots and pair the valid passwords
for each time slot. However the algorithm becomes ineffective in cases where multiple
simultaneous authentications are attempted on a single time slot.
3. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
This section covers a discussion for our analytical study for previous published researched
contributed to the solution for denial of sleep attacks. The study includes simulation of the most
related solution.
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The most common transmission synchronization protocol for wireless sensor networks is
synchronous transmission [3]. The reason researches prefer to use synchronous synchronization is
because it allows nodes to sleep most of the time so they can save power resources and wake up
after a pre-specified period of time to resume communications. This advantage however is
coupled with a major problem. Nodes always have to wake up even if transmissions are not
necessary in order to check for incoming data from a neighbour requesting to carry data to the
sink (multi-hop environment). Equation 1 presents the amount of energy Escheduled that is
consumed regardless whether or not it transmits data and derives from the following parameters.
Where Pswitch is the power required to switch from active mode to sleep mode or from sleep to
active mode.
Where tactive is the time that the node remains active.
Where Pactive is the power consumed while the node is on active state.
Where Ptransceive is the power consumed for transmission and reception.
Equation 1: Energy required for each scheduled wakeup up on synchronous protocols.
Asynchronous models on the other hand do not need to periodically wake up in order to check for
incoming data. However they are considered to be highly exposed to denial of sleep attacks on
insecure environments. This happens because nodes will have to accept wake up on any wake
request either by other nodes or by an adversary that is sending malicious request to keep the
node busy on purpose. Previous attempts to prevent the power exhaust of the batteries have been
conducted using detection of anomaly methods[10]. The results of these researches are
satisfactory enough regarding the prevention of power surge but only after the attack have
succeeded several times to trigger the detection and also insufficient to proceed with a normal
operation after the detection. So from above we consider intrusion detection systems incapable of
counter attack a denial of sleep attack.
A viable solution we have identified fuelled us to investigate furthermore the use of a wake up
receiver as proposed on [8]. Rainer Falk et al proposed the use of the wake up receiver as a door
keeper that wakes up the rest of node’s parts only when the wake up receiver receives a valid
token. In spite of the contribution to the community and intellectual nourishment they offered us
we consider the research incomplete in an energy aspect. The lack of deep investigation on token
exchange leads us to consider that nodes will have to spend energy on transmitting next useable
token or a key-chain to the network. In addition even if we consider that key chain is capable
enough to cover the entire lifetime instead of token exchange for each node, we can also present a
scenario that the scheme will fail. Figure 1 illustrates a simulation for a scenario we designed to
visualize the vulnerability we have identified in Falk et al’s proposed scheme. We have used
three nodes communicating asynchronously.
1. All nodes on initialization stage they exchange their tokens so they can use them to
remotely wake up each other.
2. Later we trigger Node 0 to transmit to node 1 while node 2 is sleeping and it succeeds.
3. Node1 wakes up and receives the data.
4. Both Node0 and Node1 go back to sleep.
5. Node1 will change the active token because it was exposed to the aerial and a possible
eavesdropper could be hearing and capture the data.
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6. But when later Node 2 decides to transmit to Node1, will attempt an authenticating using
the same token that was used before by Node0.
7. Node1 will reject it because it is not the current active token to avoid reuse of the
previous token by an adversary node.
As a result, nodes are incapable of following any key change during their sleep and will
assume that their active remote token will be still available to be used but they will fail
instead.
Figure 1: Vulnerability of previous research
4. PROPOSED SCHEME
The basis of our proposed protocol was to investigate an efficient and secure asynchronous wake-
up scheme for wireless sensor nodes. The main idea was to keep the node always in sleep mode
and wake it up only as and when communications were necessary. Therefore to enable us to
accomplish an efficient but highly available protocol we have to use an additional receiver that is
capable of remaining in idle mode utilising only negligible amounts of energy as shown in Figure
2. This receiver will be responsible for capturing communication requests and wake up the parts
of the node which are currently at rest in order to receive the actual data.
Figure 2: Step by step wake up procedure using node’s schematic
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The security consideration of this scenario is to authenticate the incoming requests to the wake up
receiver on physical layer so that potential adversaries targeting to drain its energy by trying to
wake up the node will fail before the main receiver receives the request and try to authenticate it
using the MCU, in other words this scenario benefits from moving the authentication from
application layer to physical layer. In order to ensure the security of the protocol, we need to
consider all possible attack methods that an adversary could use whilst always keeping in mind
that power costs are the most important factor. For example we cannot use public key generation
on a sensor node because the calculations are too complex and would take a lot of time and
energy to complete. Although numerous research exploring the possibilities of using public key
encryption has been undertaken but there is a constraint on how frequently the public key can be
generated thus making it inefficient [11].
The most obvious security threat that we have to tackle is a possible reuse of a wake-up token in
the case that an adversary was listening to the channel when the token was transmitted and
captured it (replay attack). Replaying this token would cause the sleeping node to reawaken
causing a Denial of Sleep (DoS) attack [12, 13] as shown in Figure 3.Therefore we have to
differentiate the token for each unique use thereby rendering the captured token useless should an
attempt be made to use it surreptitiously.
Figure 3: Schematic of our solution for remote wake up without exchanging tokens.
4.1 Token Generation
The request that wireless sensor nodes will use to securely wake up each other is called token.
Each node will have to transmit a token before the actual data. The algorithm that generates the
token is the core of this solution because the entire authentication is based on the validity of the
token.
Both requesting and sleeping node will have to generate the same token before a communication
establishes. The sleeping node will generate the token to store it at the wake up receiver and the
requesting node will have to generate the same token to transmit it in order to request a remote
wake up.
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As we mentioned previously each token transmitted in the network has to be unique to avoid
replay attacks. This requirement leads us to use a security authentication method called one-time-
password. Using one time password we discourage adversaries trying to capture the tokens
because the captured passwords are useless after their initial authentication.
In order to achieve a scheme that is energy efficient we avoid transmitting the generated tokens to
the network because radio communication costs a lot of energy (the rest doesn’t make sense as
there is no explanation as to why a node needs to populate each token prior to waking up) and
each node should populate by transmission its token to all its neighbours. Therefore we propose
the counter-synchronised one time password for token generation. Using counter-synchronization,
nodes will simply have to maintain the correct counter time and use it to generate the wake-up
token as and when required. So each node uses the counter value as the token to wake-up its
neighbours.
4.2 Encryption
Encryption of the token will have to be used for two important reasons. The first reason is to
prevent adversaries from reading the token and use it to generate the next one, which
consequently causes a sleep deprivation attack risk. The second reason is to differentiate the
tokens for each sensor node so that the wake-up requests are always unique and do not conflict
with each other and avoid overhearing of the wake up token.
We have decided to use symmetric cipher encryption because analysis has proven that it is the
most suitable for lightweight applications [14-16] particularly the TEA algorithm that consumes
only 7.37 μW or AES that is more effective and can be used in case we consider that TEA is not
secure enough.
Combining token generation with encryption, the algorithm generation derives from the following
algorithm Token = TEAK(Counter-Value) where K is the unique static encryption key for each
node or can also be referred to as the ID of the node.
4.3 Time Slots
In order to minimize the cost of computation power we need to separate the time into slots so that
each token calculation will be generated to be valid for period of time and not just a moment in
time. As for the Equation 2 where t is the time slot, Pwn is the power needed to wake up and
where Pcn is the power needed to calculate the token.
Equation 2: Relationship between time slot and power consumption.
By enlarging the duration of each time slot the sum of the power consumption will be minimized
dependent on the increase in duration but by doing this we limit the total number of possible
authentications that can take place because for each slot only one authentication can be
undertaken as illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Our solution under replay attack.
In case a node has to receive two data streams from two different nodes in one time slot, the
second node will have to be rejected to ensure that the data is fresh and not a replay of the
previous data used by an adversary. The proposed solution to this problem, which also comes
with a new problem attached, is to alternate the token after it has been used either by encrypting it
again or by following a hash-chain every time is used [17]. However we consider this method
ineffective because it can cause delays depending on the load of the network. Those delays could
self-damage the requesting nodes until they realize that the original token has been already been
used. We are currently working on the most efficient handle of multiple authentications on a
single time slot.
4.4 Wake-up Receiver and costs
An example of an ultra-low wake up receiver that could be used on this scenario is the
ATA5283[18] which claims that it uses only 1.2 uA to listen which means that it can listen
continuously on the channel for ten years using a single AA battery, which is possibly less than
the self-discharge rate of the battery when idle. Jie Wang et al [19] proposed a circuit
modification to harvest enough power from the incoming signal to power the wake up receiver
which also leads to complete immunization from possible attacks to the wakeup receiver itself.
Therefore by using the ATA5283 as an additional receiver, configured to always be in active
mode we can achieve an energy efficient asynchronous system, capable of handling the reception
of data at all times asynchronously.
4.4.1 Harmonic Collaboration
Although wake-up receiver and the main transceiver have different characteristics there is a
requirement to ensure that the network will operate as expected. The most important requirement
is that main radio and wake up radio should harmonically collaborate regarding timing and radio
range. The main transceiver has to be at the same range as the wakeup receiver so that both
wakeup and main radio can communicate with the same neighbours. Synchronization of the
sender and the receiver regarding the time required to respond to the signal is also an important
factor to be considered in order to avoid conflicts and corrupted messages. Acknowledgments can
be used also if required to ensure that the transceiver is active after the wake up request has been
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received but sacrifices the energy resources of the requesting node, therefore this option should
only be implemented where it is considered business critical, and also by exception only.
4.4.2 Node initialization
During the initialization, the MCU must generate an encryption key derived by its ID as defined
by the data sink. This key will be used to encrypt the token so that adversaries cannot capture,
identify the pattern and then generate a wake up token. In addition each node should discover its’
neighbours to be able to encrypt the tokens using the remote ID. Exploration of neighbours is an
unavoidable procedure that is also used by routing so that nodes will know the shortest path to the
sink.
4.4.3 Power cost
Another problem that the scheme could face is the maintenance of the correct network time to
follow the time stamps and the energy cost. For the node to maintain the correct time the MCU
must remain active. Atmel also introduced a new technology called picoPower technology which
allows the MCU to sleep but keep the Real time counter ticking. The outcome of this design leads
to a 650nA consumption or autonomy using a single battery for over 400 years[20].
4.4.4 Wake-up Procedure
Each one of the nodes should have its own encryption key along with a list of its neighbour’s
encryption keys. For most of the time the nodes should be asleep and waiting for an interruption.
The interruptions can be one of the following, a sensor interruption to take a reading, a wake-up
receiver interruption that activates the node to wake it up in order to receive data by another node,
or a refresh token interruption that originates from the MCU and occurs when the active token
expires because the time slot has expired.
Figure 5: Simulation using omnet++ of previous proposed scheme.
Our proposed scheme advocates that the wake-up receiver never sleeps; it must remain active and
wait to receive an authenticated encrypted token which is the next one in the series that is
currently stored in the receiver. So in case another node “Node2” (for example) has taken a
reading and needs to transmit it through this node “Node1”, it must first calculate the token
derived by the time slot and encrypt it using the encryption key that the destination node “Node1”
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will accept. This will cause the target nodes’ wakeup receiver to wake the entire node and prepare
the actual receiver for reception. After the transmission is complete both nodes should either
continue their tasks or go back into sleep mode. In case they plan to go in to sleep mode, they
must first store in their wake-up receiver the new token.
4.4.5 Anti-replay
One of the features of our protocol is to counter attack replay attacks. An adversary within close
proximity could be listening for the wake up tokens and try to inject them into the network to
engage a sleep deprivation attack. Therefore we have simulated the protocol using omnet++ to
prove that a replay attack would fail to authenticate to the nodes. The network setup consists of
three nodes Node0, Node1, Node2 and an adversary as shown in Figure 6. Node0 and Node2 will
randomly initiate a connection to Node1 to transmit a data message but every time the adversary
node receives a wakeup token it will replay (re-transmit) it to the network in an attempt to wake
up the node and send malicious data to it. Figure 7 illustrates the results of our simulation filtered
to show only the important information. As you can see each time the adversary receives a
message it broadcasts the token and data to the nodes but the nodes do not accept the token and
the data message is not received because at the main receiver remains asleep as was intended.
Figure 6: Simulation using omnet++ of our scheme.
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Figure 7: Graphic representation of the transmitted messages against time.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Proposed scheme can effectively immunize the network from deprivation attacks by moving
authentication from application level to physical layer and simultaneous reduce unnecessary
traffic by calculating the tokens instead of exchanging them. Calculation power is insignificant
compared to transmission and reception power and at the same time does not expose
cryptographic material to adversaries. We consider that our scheme under attack by denial of
sleep attacks will consume less power than the self-discharge of the batteries. We are currently
working on simulating the same scenario but on power aspects and solving the problem that occur
on concurrent connections at the same time slot.
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